Abstract-With the rise of sensors such as the Microsoft Kinect, Leap Motion, and hand motion sensors in phones (i.e., Samsung Galaxy S6), gesture-based interfaces have become practical. Unfortunately, today, to recognize such gestures, applications must have access to depth and video of the user, exposing sensitive data about the user and her environment. Besides these privacy concerns, there are also security threats in sensor-based applications, such as multiple applications registering the same gesture, leading to a conflict (akin to Clickjacking on the web).
Introduction
Over 20 million Kinect sensors are in use today, bringing millions of people in contact with games and other applications that respond to voice and gestures. Other companies such as Leap Motion and Prime Sense are bringing lowcost depth and gesture sensing to consumer electronics. The newest generation of smart phones such as Samsung Galaxy S5 supports rudimentary gestures as well.
Context of prior work:
The security and privacy community is starting to pay attention to concerns created by the emergence of these technologies. Specifically, we have seen several proposals on the intersection of augmented reality, privacy, and security. D'Antoni et al. [6] provides a high-level overview of the problem space. Darkly [12] , like our work, puts a layer between the untrusted application and raw sensor data. Unlike us, Darkly lacks a formal semantics and does not allow precise reasoning about application properties. Jana et al. [11] introduces the notion of an OS abstraction called a recognizer which enables gesture detection. Yet their approach fails to provide a way to extend the system with new recognizers in a safe manner. SurroundWeb [27] demonstrates what a 3D web browser modified with new abstractions for input and output to protect privacy and security would look like. Yet it also lacks the capacity for precise automatic reasoning. We are also inspired by world-drive access control [24] , which attempts to restrict applications from accessing sensitive objects in the environment. Lastly, Proton [15] is an example of defining a higher-level abstraction for gestures that enables precise reasoning.
Background
User demand for sensors such as Kinect is driven by exciting new applications, ranging from immersive Xbox games to purpose-built shopping solutions to healthcare applications for monitoring elders. Each of these sensors comes with an SDK which allows third-party developers to build new and compelling applications. Several devices such as Microsoft Kinect and Leap Motion use the App Store model to deliver software to the end-user. Examples of such stores include Leap Motion's Airspace airspace. com, Oculus Platform, and Google Glassware http:// glass-apps.org.
These platforms will evolve to support multiple untrusted applications provided by third parties, running on top of a trusted core such as an operating system. Since such applications are likely to be distributed through centralized App stores, there is a chance for application analysis and enforcement of key safety properties. Below we describe some of the specific threats posed by applications to each other and to the user. We refer the reader to D'Antoni [6] for a more comprehensive discussion of threats. To address these threats, we introduce Prepose, a novel domain specific language and runtime for writing gesture recognizers. We designed this language with semantics in terms of SMT formulas. This allows us to use the state of the art SMT solver Z3 both for static analysis and for runtime matching of gestures to user movements.
A Case for Controlled Access to Skeletal Data
There is a natural trade-off between the platform functionality provided to potentially untrusted applications and possible threats to the end-user. We take a twopronged approach to deliver a degree of security, privacy, and reliability. Privacy is achieved through the use of a domain-specific language Prepose, whereas security and reliability are both achieved through the use of sound static analysis. By combining system design and sound static analysis, Prepose improves the security, privacy, and reliability properties of gesture programming. We discuss privacy-related issues in this section and security and reliability in Section 1.3.
Prepose raises the privacy bar, keeping in mind that perfect privacy is elusive. The degree to which end-users are comfortable with privacy disclosure varies considerably as well. Therefore it is important to analyze different points in the design space for untrusted applications that use gesture recognition. Figure 1 summarizes three different levels of functionality for untrusted applications that need gesture recognition. On the bottom, applications can be written in languages such as C++ and have access to raw video and depth. Access to the raw video stream is seen as highly privacy-sensitive [11, 27] . In the middle, applications are written in memory-safe languages such as C# or Java and have access only to the skeleton API provided by Kinect for Windows. What is less obvious is that at the middle level, the skeleton data also leads to potential loss of privacy. Specifically, the following attacks are possible
• The skeleton API reveals how many people are in the room. This may reveal whether the person is alone or not. If alone, perhaps she is a target for robbery; if she's found to be not alone, that may reveal that she's involved with someone illicitly.
• The skeleton API reveals the person's height (relative height of joints is exposed, and the Kinect API allows C# and skeletal data C++ and raw data Prepose and application logic
Fig. 1:
Three different levels of data access for untrusted applications that perform gesture recognition. We call out threats to the user at each levels.
Category Property Description
Reliability gesture safety validates that gestures have a basic measure of physical safety, i.e. do not require the user to overextend herself physically in ways that may be dangerous.
Reliability inner validity checks for inner contradictions i.e. do not require the user to both keep her arms up and down.
Security protected gestures tests whether a gesture conflicts with a reserved system-wide gesture such as the Kinect attention gesture (http://bit.ly/1JlXk79).
Security conflicts finds potential conflicts within a set of gestures such as two gestures that would both be recognized from the same user movements. properties are reliability properties which aid gesture developers. The second two are security properties that prevent untrusted applications from conflicting with the OS or with other applications.
mapping from skeleton points to depth space so actual height as well). The application could distinguish people by "fingerprinting" skeletons.
• The skeleton API reveals fine grained position of the person's hands. The application can in principle learn something about what they write if they write on a whiteboard, for example.
Static Analysis for Security & Reliability
At the heart of Prepose is the idea of compiling gesture descriptions to formulae for an SMT solver such as Z3 [21] . These formulae capture the semantics of the gestures, enabling precise analyses that boil down to satisfiability queries to the SMT solver. The Prepose language has been designed to be both expressive enough to support complex gestures, yet restrictive enough to ensure that key properties remain decidable. In this paper we focus on the four properties summarized in Figure 2 and detailed in Section 3.4. Note that a gesture-based application written in C++ or Java would generally require an extensive manual audit to ensure the lack of privacy leaks and security flaws.
Threat Model
Prepose, at the top of the pyramid in Figure 1 , provides the next layer of privacy by mediating direct access to the skeleton API. While the threats emanating from raw video access and skeleton access are eliminated by design, in Prepose we worry about higher-level properties such as inter-gesture conflicts and gesture safety. This is akin to how programming in a memory-safe language allows one to focus on enforcing semantic security properties without worrying about buffer overruns. As a matter of security and privacy in depth, Prepose is at the higher level within the pyramid, following the classic security principle of least privilege.
As is often the case with privacy mechanisms, there are some side channels that are harder to protect from. In our scenario, Prepose does not directly protect against tracking the user by learning which gestures they can perform (only some users are capable of certain gestures) or whether, for example, their house is big enough by testing if the user is able to perform gestures that require a greater freedom of movement. While we do not to attempt to catalog all the possible attacks that may emerge [6] , relying on Prepose gives us confidence that untrusted applications can do less harm than if they had additional capabilities (lower within the pyramid).
Prepose Architecture
The trusted core of Prepose enforces privacy by mediating between applications and the raw sensor data. Inter-application conflicts and unsafe gestures are avoided through static analysis powered by the Z3 SMT solver. Figure 4 shows our architecture and the security boundary we draw.
Gesture store: We are also inspired by App Stores for developer components, such as the Unity 3D Asset store which offers developers the ability to buy models, object, and other similar components (https://www.assetstore. unity3d.com). Today, when developers write their own gesture recognizers from scratch, they use machine learning methods, or libraries from github and sourceforge. Our focus in this paper is on gesture recognizers, which are integral components of AR applications responsible for detecting gestures performed by users.
As in the case of mobile apps, the App Store centralized distribution model provides a unique opportunity to ensure the security and privacy of gestures before they are unleashed on unsuspecting users. As such, our approach in Prepose is to check gestures when they are submitted to the gesture store. Figure 5 summarizes our approach. Developers write gesture recognizers in a high-level domain-specific language, Prepose, then submit them to the gesture store. Because our domain-specific language has been carefully engineered, we can perform precise and sound static analyses for a range of security and privacy properties. The results of this analysis tell us whether the submitted gesture is "definitely OK,""definitely not OK," or, as may happen occasionally, "needs attention from a human auditor." In our experiments in Section 5, we encountered only one case of reasoning needing attention. A reasonable approach would be to reject submissions that do not qualify as "definitely OK."
Improving gesture authoring experience: In addition to addressing threats from untrusted applications, a language-based approach can improve gesture authoring. Gestures are an integral part of sensor-based always-on application, the equivalent of UI events like left mouse click, double-click, etc. in regular applications 1 . While, for instance, the Kinect SDK already includes a number of default gestures, developers typically need to add their own. Different applications often require different sets of gestures, and, as such, building new gestures is a fundamental part of software development.
Gesture development is a tricky process, which often depends on machine learning techniques requiring large volumes of training data [7] . These heavyweight methods are both expensive and time-consuming for many developers, resulting in mostly large game studios being able to afford gesture development. Therefore, making gesture development easier would unlock the creativity of a larger class of developers. Prepose aids this with sound static analyses for reliability properties of gestures, such as whether the gesture definition is self-contradictory.
Prepose language and runtime: This paper proposes Prepose, a language and a runtime for authoring and checking gesture-based applications. For illustration, a code snippet supported by our system in shown in Figure 3 . This code is translated into logical formulas which are checked at runtime against the user's actual positions using an SMT solver.
Prepose Figure 8a or can be seen in a video at http://reflexionhealth.com. These applications can run, concurrently, for weeks on end, with only minimal needs to report results (such as completing a certain level within the tai-chi application) to an external server.
Contributions
Our paper makes the following contributions:
• Prepose. Proposes a programming language and a runtime for a broad range of gesture-based immersive applications designed from the ground up with security and privacy in mind. Prepose follows the principle of privacy by construction to eliminate the majority of privacy attacks.
• Static analysis. We propose a set of static analysis algorithms designed to soundly find violations of important security and reliability properties. This analysis is designed to be run within a gesture App Store to prevent malicious third-party applications from affecting the end-user.
• Expressiveness. To show the expressiveness of Prepose, we encode 28 gestures for 3 useful application domains: therapy, dance, and tai-chi.
• Performance evaluation. Despite being written in a domain-specific language (DSL), Prepose-based gesture applications pay a minimal price for the extra security and privacy guarantees in runtime overhead; tasks like pose matching take milliseconds. Our static analysis scales well in practice: safety checking is under 0.5 seconds per gesture; average validity checking time is only 188 ms; lastly, for 97% of the cases, the conflict detection time is below 5 seconds, with only one query taking longer than 15 seconds.
Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on gesture authoring. Section 3 gives an overview of Prepose concepts and provides some motivating examples. Section 4 describes our analysis for security and privacy in detail. Section 5 contains the details of our experimental evaluation. Sections 7 and 8 describe related work and conclude.
Background
Today, developers of immersive, sensor-based applications pursue two major approaches to creating new gesture recognizers. First, developers write code that explicitly encodes the gesture's movements in terms of the Kinect Skeleton or other similar abstraction exposed by the platform. Second, developers use machine learning approaches to synthesize gesture recognition code from labeled examples. We discuss the pros and cons of each approach each in turn.
Manually written:
In this approach, the developer first thinks carefully about the gesture movements in terms of an abstraction exposed by the platform. For example, the Kinect for Windows platform exposes a "skeleton" that encodes a user's joint positions. The developer then writes custom code in a general-purpose programming language such as C++ or C# that checks properties of the user's position and then sets a flag if the user moves in a way to perform the gesture. For example, the Kinect for Windows white paper on gesture development [16] contains code for a simple punch gesture, shown in Figure 6 . The code checks that the user's hand is "far enough" away from the shoulder, that the hand is moving "fast enough," that the elbow is also moving "fast enough," and that the angle between the upper and lower arm is greater than a threshold. If all these checks pass, the code signals that a punch gesture has been detected.
Manually-written poses require no special tools, data collection, or training, which makes them easy to start with. Unfortunately, they also have significant drawbacks.
• First, the code is hard to understand because it typically reasons about user movements at a low level. For example, the code uses a dot-product to check the angle between the lower and upper arm instead of an abstraction that directly returns the angle.
• Second, building these gestures requires a trained programmer and maintaining code requires manually tweaking threshold values, which may or may not work well for a wider range of users. Third, it is difficult to statically analyze this code because it is written in a general purpose programming language, so gesture conflicts or unsafe gestures must be detected at runtime.
• Finally, the manually coded gesture approach requires the application to have access to sensor data for the purpose of recognizing gestures. This raises privacy problems, as we have discussed: a malicious developer may directly embed some code to capture video stream or skeleton data to send it to http://evil.com.
Machine learning:
The leading alternative to manuallycoded gesture recognizers is to use machine learning approaches. In machine learning approaches, the developer first creates a training set consisting of videos of people performing the gesture. The developer then labels the videos with which frames and which portions of the depth or RGB data in the frame correspond to the gesture's movements. Finally, the developer runs an existing machine learning algorithm, such as AdaBoost, to synthesize gesture recognition code that can be included in a program. Figure 7 shows the overall workflow for the Visual Gesture Builder, a machine learning gesture tool that ships with the Kinect for Windows SDK. The developer takes recordings of many different people performing the same gesture, then tags the recordings to provide labeled data. From the labeled data, the developer synthesizes a classifier for the gesture. The classifier runs as a library in the application.
Machine learning approaches have important benefits compared to manually-written poses. If the training set contains a diverse group of users, such as users of different sizes and ages, the machine learning algorithm can "automatically" discover how to detect the gesture for different users without manual tweaking. In addition, improving the gesture recognition becomes a problem of data acquisition and labeling, instead of requiring manual tweaking by a trained programmer. As a result, many Kinect developers today use machine learning approaches.
On the other hand, machine learning has drawbacks as well. Gathering the data and labeling it can be expensive, especially if the developer wants a wide range of people in the training set. Training itself requires setting multiple parameters, where proper settings require familiarity with the machine learning approach used. The resulting code created by machine learning may be difficult to interpret or manually "tweak" to create new gestures. Finally, just as with manually written gestures, the resulting code is even more difficult to analyze automatically and requires access to sensor data to work properly.
Overview
We first show a motivating example in Section 3.1. Next, we discuss the architecture of Prepose and how it provides security and privacy benefits (3.2). We then introduce basic concepts of the Prepose language and discuss its runtime execution (3.3). Finally, we discuss the security and privacy issues raised by an App Store for gestures, and show how static analysis can address them (3.4).
Motivating Example
Existing application on Kinect: Figure 8a shows a screen shot from the Reflexion Health physical therapy product. The reader is strongly encouraged to watch the video at http://reflexionhealth.com for more context. Here, a Kinect for Windows is pointed at the user. An on-screen animation demonstrates a target gesture for the user. Along the top of the screen, the application gives an English description of the gesture. Also on screen is an outline that tracks the user's actual position, enabling the user to compare against the model. Along the top, the program also gives feedback in English about what movements the user must make to properly perform the therapy gesture.
Reflexion is an example of a broader class of trainer applications that continually monitor a user and give feedback on the user's progress toward gestures. The key point is that trainer applications all need to continuously monitor the user's position to judge how well the user performs a gesture. This monitoring is explicit in Reflexion Health, but in other settings, such as Atlas5D's eldercare, the monitoring may be implicit and multiple gestures may be tracked at once. Encoding existing poses: We now drill down into an example to show how applications can encode gesture recognizers using the Prepose approach. Figure 8b shows a common ballet pose, taken from an instructional book on ballet. The illustration is accompanied by text describing the pose. The text states in words that ankles should be crossed, that arms should be bent at a certain angle, and so on. Figure 8 shows the Prepose code which captures the ballet pose. Because of the way we have designed the Prepose language, this code is close to the English description of the ballet pose. A ballet trainer application would include this code, which is then sent to the Prepose runtime for interpretation. Figure 4 shows the architecture of Prepose. Multiple applications run concurrently. Each application has one or more gestures written in the Prepose language. These applications are not trusted and do not have access to raw sensor data. Instead, applications register their gesture code with a trusted Prepose runtime. This runtime is responsible for interpreting the gestures given access to raw depth, video, or other data about the user's position. When a gesture is recognized, the runtime calls back to the application which registered the gesture.
Gestures in Prepose:

Architectural Goals
We draw a security boundary between the trusted component and untrusted applications. Only Prepose code crosses this boundary from untrusted applications to trusted components. In our implementation, the trusted component is written in managed C#, which makes it difficult for an untrusted application to cause a memory safety error. Our design therefore provides assurance that untrusted applications will not be able to access private sensor data directly, while still being able to define new gesture recognizers.
Prepose has been designed for analyzability. Developers submit code written in the Prepose language to a gesture App Store. During submission, we can afford to spend significant time (say, an hour or two) on performing static analyses. We now describe the specific security and privacy properties we support, along with the analyses needed to check them.
Basic Concepts in Prepose
In contrast to the approaches above, Prepose defines a domain specific language for writing gesture recognizers. The basic unit of the Prepose language is the pose. A pose may contain transformations that specify the target position of the user explicitly, or it may contain restrictions that specify a range of allowed positions. A pose composes these transformations and restrictions to specify a function that takes a body position and decides if the position matches the pose. At runtime, Prepose applies this function to determine if the user's current body position matches the pose. For poses that consist solely of transformations, Prepose also at runtime synthesizes a target position for the user, enabling Prepose to measure how close the user is to matching the pose and provide real time feedback to the user on how to match the pose.
A gesture specifies a sequence of poses. The user must match each pose in the sequence provided. The gesture is said to match when the last pose in the sequence matches. At runtime, Prepose checks the user's body position to see if it matches the current pose.
In our current implementation, Prepose poses and gestures are written in terms of the Kinect skeleton. The Kinect skeleton is a collection of body joints, which are distinguished points in a three-dimensional coordinate space that correspond to the physical location of the user's head, left and right arms, and other body parts. Our approach, however, could be generalized to other methods (c) A sample ballet gesture written in Prepose.
The gesture defines two poses, which are specifications of a body position. Then, the gesture execution specifies the sequence of poses that must be matched to perform the gesture. In the first line, the transformation "rotate" takes as arguments the name of the user skeleton joint "left wrist," the amount of rotation "30 degrees," and the direction of rotation. The second line is similar. The third line is a transformation "point" that takes as arguments the name of a user skeleton joint and a direction "up." When applied to a skeleton position, the effect of all three transformations is to come up with a single new target skeleton for the user.
A restriction is a function that takes as input a Kinect skeleton, checks if the skeleton falls within a range of allowed positions, and then returns true or false. An example restriction in Prepose looks like this: put your right hand on your head
The intuition here is that "on your head" is a restriction because it does not explicitly specify a single position. Instead, a range of allowed positions, namely those there the hand is within a threshold distance from the head, is denoted by this function. Here, the function "put" takes as arguments two joints, the "right hand" and the "head." The function returns true if the right hand is less than a threshold distance from the head and false otherwise. Poses can incorporate multiple transformations and multiple restrictions. The pose matches if all restrictions are true and the user's body position is also closer than a threshold to the target position. Gestures: Gestures consist of zero or more pose declarations, followed by an execution sequence. For example, a gesture for doing "the wave" might contain the following:
point-hands-up , point-hands-forward , point-hands-down .
That is, to do "the wave," the user needs to put her hands up, then move her hands from there to pointing forward, and then finally point her hands downward. The gesture matches when the user successfully reaches the end of the execution sequence. Our Prepose runtime allows multiple gestures to be loaded at a time. The execution sequence of a gesture can use any pose defined by any loaded gesture, which allows developers to build libraries of poses that can be shared by different gestures.
Runtime execution: Figure 9 shows the stages of runtime processing in Prepose. A high-level Prepose statement is compiled into C# code, which in turn defines an SMT formula. The formula is used both for runtime matching and static analysis.
Gesture Security and Reliability
At gesture submission time, we apply static analysis to the submitted Prepose program. This analysis can be performed within the App store before the user is allowed to download a new application that contains gestures. Conflict checking may also be done as information about which applications are installed is already available to the App store. Conceivably, the analysis may be done on the client as well. The results of this analysis tell us whether the submitted gesture is "definitely OK," "definitely not OK," or, as may happen occasionally, "needs attention from a human auditor." This kind of triage is fairly typical in the App store context.
We currently perform the four analyses summarized in Figure 2 . As we explain below, this analysis amounts to queries resolved by the underlying SMT solver, Z3. Gesture safety: The first analysis is for gesture safety. Just because it's possible to ask someone to make a gesture does not mean it is a good idea. A gesture may ask people to overextend their limbs, make an obscene motion, or otherwise potentially harm the user. To prevent an unsafe gesture from being present in the store, we first define safety restrictions. Safety restrictions are sets of body positions that are not acceptable. Safety restrictions are encoded as SMT formulas that specify disallowed positions for Kinect skeleton joints. Internal validity: It is possibly in Prepose to write a gestures that can never be matched. For example, a gesture that requires the user to keep their arms both up and down contains an internal contradiction. We analyze Prepose gestures to ensure they lack internal contradictions. Reserved gestures: A special case of conflict detection is detecting overlap with reserved gestures. For example, the Xbox Kinect has a particular attention gesture that opens the Xbox OS menu even if another game or program is running. Checking conflicts with reserved gestures is important because applications should not be able to "shadow" the system's attention gesture with its own gestures. Conflict detection: We say that a pair of gestures conflicts if the user's movements match both gestures simultaneously. Gesture conflicts can happen accidentally, because gestures are written independently by different application developers. Alternatively, a malicious application can intentionally register a gesture that conflicts with another application. In Prepose, because all gestures have semantics in terms of SMT formulas, we can ask a solver if there exists a sequence of body positions that matches both gestures. If the solver completes, then either it certifies that there is no such sequence or gives an example. Figure 10 shows a BNF for Prepose which we currently support. This captures how Prepose applications can be composed out of gestures, gestures composed out of poses and execution blocks, execution blocks can be composed out of execution steps, etc 2 . The grammar is fairly extensible: if one wishes to support other kinds of transforms or restrictions, one needs to extend the Prepose grammar, regenerate the parser, and provide runtime support for the added transform or restriction. Note also that the Prepose grammar lends itself naturally to the creation of developer tools such as context-sensitive auto-complete in an IDE or text editor.
Techniques
Rotate-Frontal+ Rotate-Frontal(j, a, Clockwise) j.Y = cos(a) · j.Y + sin(a) · j.Z j.Z = −sin(a) · j.Y + cos(a) · j.Z Rotate-Frontal- Rotate-Frontal(j, a, CounterClockwise) j.Y = cos(a) · j.Y − sin(a) · j.Z j.Z = sin(a) · j.Y + cos(a) · j.Z Rotate-Sagittal+ Rotate-Sagittal(j, a, Clockwise) j.X = cos(a) · j.X + sin(a) · j.Y j.Y = −sin(a) · j.X + cos(a) · j.Y Rotate-Sagittal- Rotate-Sagittal(j, a, CounterClockwise) j.X = cos(a) · j.X − sin(a) · j.Y j.Y = sin(a) · j.X + cos(a) · j.Y Rotate-Horizontal+ Rotate-Horizontal(j, a, Clockwise) j.X = cos(a) · j.X + sin(a) · j.Z j.Z = −sin(a) · j.X + cos(a) · j.Z Rotate-Horizontal- Rotate-Horizontal(j, a, CounterClockwise) j.X = cos(a) · j.X − sin(a) · j.Z j.Z = sin(a) · j.X + cos(a) · j.Z
Prepose to SMT Formulas
Prepose compiles programs written in the Prepose language to formulae in Z3, a state-of-the-art SMT solver. Translating basic transforms: Figure 11 captures the principles of translating Prepose transforms into Z3 terms; the figure shows the different variants of how rotatePlane from Figure 10 is translated by way of illustration. These are update rules that define the X, Y, Z coordinates of the joint j to which the transformation is applied. Note that rotatePlane transformations take the plane p and direction d as parameters. Depending on the type of rotation, namely, the rotation plane, one of these rules is picked. These coordinate updates generally require a trigonometric computation 3 . Figure 12 and th angle are static thresholds: they define what it means to perform a specific pose. For instance, touching a surface does not mean literally touching it; being very close to it is sufficient. As in Figure 11 , j is the joint position (with X, Y , and Z components).
Translating basic restrictions:
are static thresholds that are part of pose definition, as opposed to runtime thresholds used for matching.
Runtime Execution: After a Prepose script is translated to Z3 constraints, we use the Z3 solver to match a user's movements to the gesture. The trusted core of Prepose registers with the Kinect skeleton tracker to receive updated skeleton positions of the user.
For each new position, the runtime uses the Z3 term evaluation mechanism to automatically apply gestures to the previous user's position to obtain the target (in a sense, ideal) position for each potential gesture. This target position is in turn compared to the current user's joints' position to see if there is a match and to notify the application. Note that this is an approximate comparison where the level of precision can be specified by the application (see, for instance, Figure 13 with a slider for specifying the accuracy of the match). Note that this is a very lightweight use of the theorem prover, as we only evaluate terms without doing satisfiability checking. One could also have a custom runtime matching mechanism instead. Upon receiving a notification, the application may then give feedback to the user, such as encouragement, badges for completing a gesture, or movement to a more difficult gesture.
Security and Reliability
By design, Prepose is amenable to sound static reasoning by translating queries into Z3 formulae. Below we show how to convert key security and reliability properties into Z3 queries. The underlying theory we use is that of reals. We also use non-recursive data types (tuples) within Z3.
Please remember that these are static analyses that typically take place before gestures are deployed to the end-user -there is no runtime checking overhead. The properties below are also briefly summarized in Figure 2 . Unlike approximate runtime matching described above, static analysis is about precise, ideal matching. We do not have a theory of approximate equality that is supported by the theorem prover. We treat gestures such as G : B → B, in other words, as functions that transform bodies in set B to new bodies.
Basic gesture safety:
The goal of these restrictions is to make sure we "don't break any bones" by allowing the user to follow this gesture. We define a collection of safety restrictions pertaining to the head, spine, shoulders, elbows, hips, and legs. We denote by R S the compiled restriction, the set of all states that are allowed under our safety restrictions. The compiled restriction R S is used to test whether for a given gesture G Inner validity: We also want to ensure that our gesture are not inherently contradictory, in other words, is it the case that all sequences of body positions will fail to match the gesture. An example of a gesture that has an inner contradiction, consider put your arms up ; put your arms down ;
Obviously both of these requirements cannot be satisfied at once. In the Z3 translation, this will give rise to a contradiction: joint["rightelbow"].Y = 1 ∧ joint["rightelbow"].Y = −1. To find possible contradictions in gesture definitions, we use the following query:
¬∃b ∈ B : G(b).
Protected gestures: Several immersive sensor-based systems include so-called "system attention positions" that users invoke to get privileged access to the system. These are the AR equivalent of Ctrl-Alt-Delete on a Windows system. For example, the Kinect on Xbox has a Kinect Guide gesture that brings up the home screen no matter which game is currently being played. The Kinect "Return to Home" gesture is easily encoded in Prepose and the reader can see this gesture here: http://bit.ly/1JlXk79. For Google Glass, a similar utterance is "Okay Glass." On Google Now on a Motorola X phone, the utterance is "Okay Google."
We want to make sure that Prepose gesture do not attempt to redefine system attention positions.
where S ⊂ B is the set of pre-defined system attention positions. Conflict detection: Conflict detection, in contrast, involves two possibly interacting gestures G 1 and G 2 .
Optionally, one could also attempt to test whether compositions of gestures can yield the same outcome. For example, is it possible that
This can also be operated as a query on sequences of bodies in B.
Experimental Evaluation
We built a visual gesture development and debugging environment, which we call Prepose Explorer. Figure 13 shows a screen shot of our tool. On the left, a text entry box allows a developer to write Prepose code with proper syntax highlighting. On the right, the tool shows the user's current position in green and the target position in white. On the bottom, the tool gives feedback about the current pose being matched and how close the user's position is to the target.
Dimensions of Evaluation
Given that Prepose provides guarantees about security and privacy by construction, we focused on making sure that we are able to program a wide range of applications that involve gestures, as summarized in Figure 14 and also partially shown in the Appendix. Beyond that we want to ensure that the Prepose-based gesture matching scales well to support interactive games, etc. To summarize
• We used this tool to measure the expressiveness of Prepose by creating 28 gestures in three different domains.
• We then ran some benchmarks to measure runtime performance and static analysis performance of Prepose. First, we report runtime performance, including the amount of time required to match a pose and the time to synthesize a new target position. Then, we discuss the results of benchmarks for static analysis. Prior work has used surveys to evaluate whether the information revealed by various abstractions is acceptable to a sample population of users in terms of its privacy. Here, we are giving the application the least amount of information required to do its jobs, so these surveys are not necessary. 
Expressiveness
Because the Prepose language is not Turing-complete, it has limitations on the gestures it can express. To determine if our choices in building the language are sufficient to handle useful gestures, we built gestures using the Prepose Explorer. We picked three distinct areas: therapy, tai-chi, and ballet, which together cover a wide range of gestures. Figure 14 shows the breakdown of how many gestures we created in each area, for 28 in total. These are complex gestures: the reviewers are encouraged to examine the code linked to from Figure 14 .
For example, Figure 15 shows some of the poses from taichi captured by Prepose code. We chose tai-chi because it is already present in Kinect for Xbox games such as Your Shape: Fitness Evolved. In addition, tai-chi poses require complicated alignment and non-alignment between different body parts.
Pose Matching Performance
We used the Kinect Studio tool that ships with the Kinect for Windows SDK to record depth and video traces of one of the authors. We recorded a trace of performing two representative gestures. Each trace was about 20 seconds in length and consisted of about 20,000 frames, occupying about 750 MB on disk. We picked these to be two representative tai-chi gestures. Our measurements were performed on an HP Z820 Pentium Xion E52640 Sandy bridge with 6 cores and 32 GB of memory running Windows 8.1.
For each trace, we measured the matching time: the time required to evaluate whether the current user position matches the current target position. When a match occurred, we also measured the pose transition time: the time required to synthesize a new target pose, if applicable.
Our results are encouraging. On the first frame, we observed matching times between 78 ms and 155 ms, but for all subsequent frames matching time dropped substantially. For these frames, the median matching time was 4 ms. with a standard deviation of 1.08 ms. This is fast enough for real time tracking at 60 FPS (frames per second).
For pose transition time, we observed a median time of 89 ms, with a standard deviation of 36.5 ms. While this leads to a "skipped" frame each time we needed to create a new pose, this is still fast enough to avoid interrupting the user's movements.
While we have made a design decision to use a theorem prover for runtime matching, one can replace that machinery with a custom runtime matcher that is likely to run even faster. When deploying Prepose-based applications on a less powerful platform such as the Xbox, this design change may be justified.
Static Analysis Performance
Safety checking: Figure 16 shows a nearlinear dependency between the number of we performed a linear regression to see the influence of other parameters such as the number of negative restrictions. The R 2 value of the fit is about 0.9550, and the coefficients are shown in the table to the right. The median checking time is only 2 ms. We see that safety checking is practical and, given how fast it is, could easily be integrated into an IDE to give developers quick feedback about invalid gestures.
Validity checking: Figure 17 shows another near-linear dependency between the number of steps in a gesture and the time to check if the gesture is internally valid. The average checking time is 188.63 ms. We see that checking for internal validity of gestures is practical and, given how fast it is, could easily be integrated into an IDE to give developers quick feedback about invalid gestures.
Conflict checking:
We performed pairwise conflict checking between 111 pairs of gestures from our domains. Figure 18 shows the CDF of conflict checking times, with the x axis in log scale. For 90% of the cases, the checking time is below 0.170 seconds, while 97% of the cases took less than 5 seconds and 99% less than 15 seconds. Only one query out of the 111 took longer than 15 seconds. As a result, with a timeout of 15 seconds, only one query would need attention from a human auditor.
Limitations
This work is the first step in defining a programmable way to limit the potential for privacy leaks in gesture-based programming. We are not claiming that we have solved all the potential privacy issues. In fact, we believe strongly that the attack model will evolve as this space rapidly changes. A major challenge is to define a precise and easy to reason about attack model in this space. Our key contribution lies in going beyond the model that gives application direct access to hardware and providing an abstraction layer above that. It is exceedingly difficult to argue that that abstraction layer cannot be abused by a clever attacker. By way of analogy, consider an operating system mechanism that allows applications to register keystrokes (or key chords) such as Ctrl + Alt + P. While this makes it considerably more difficult to develop a keylogger, it is difficult to claim that one cannot determine whether the user is left-handed or possibly to fingerprint different users based on the frequency of their shortcut use. Similarly, in the context of Prepose, a clever attacker may define a "network" of really fine-grained gestures to collect statistics about the user.
A key advantage of Prepose is that when new attacks are discovered, they can be encoded as satisfiability queries, which gives one way to tackle these attacks as well. We see the following areas as extensions of our current work:
• We do not explicitly reason about the notion of time;
there could be a pose that is safe for brief periods of time but is less safe when held for, say, a minute. 
Related Work
Below we first describe some gesture-building approaches, mostly from the HCI community, and then we talk about privacy in sensing-based applications.
Gesture Building Tools
Below, we list some of the key projects that focus on gesture creation. Prepose's approach is unique in that it focuses on capturing gestures using English-like commands. This allows gesture definitions to be modified more easily. Prepose differs from the tools below in that it focuses on security and privacy at the level of system design.
CrowdLearner [1] provides a crowd-sourcing way to collect data from mobile devices usage in order to create recognizers for tasks specified by the developers. This way the sampling time during the application development is shorter and the collected data should represent a better coverage of real use scenarios in relation to the usual in-lab sampling procedures. Moreover, it abstracts for developers the classifier construction and population, requiring no specific recognition expertise.
Gesture Script [18] provides a unistroke touch gesture recognizer which combines training from samples with explicit description of the gesture structure. By using the tool, the developer is enabled to divide the input gestures in core parts, being able to train them separately and specify by a script language how the core parts are performed by the user. This way, it requires less samples for compound gestures because the combinations of the core parts are performed by the classifier. The division in core parts also eases the recovery of attributes (e.g. number of repetitions, line length, etc.) which can be specified by the developer during the creation of the gestures.
Proton [15] and Proton++ [14] present a tool directed to multitouch gestures description and recognition. The gestures are modeled as regular expressions and their alphabet consists of the main actions (Down, Move and Up), and related attributes e.g.: direction of the move action; place or object in which the action was taken; counter which represents a relative ID; among others. It is shown that by describing gestures with regular expressions and a concise alphabet it is possible to easily identify ambiguity between two gestures previously to the test phase.
CoGesT [8] presents a scheme to represent hand and arms gestures. It uses a grammar which generates the possible descriptions, the descriptions are based on common textual descriptions and related to the coordinate system generated by the body aligned planes (sagittal, frontal and horizontal). The transcription is mainly related to relative positions and trajectories between them, relying on the form and not on functional classification of the gesture. Moreover it does not specify the detailed position but more broad relations between body parts. This way the specified gestures are not strongly precise. On the other hand, it enables users to produce equivalent gestures by interpreting the description and using their knowledge about gesture production.
BAP [5] approaches the task of coding body movements with focus on the study of emotion expression. Actors trained the system by performing specific emotion representations and these recorded frames were coded into pose descriptions. The coding was divided into anatomic (explicating which part of the body was relevant in the gesture) and form (describing how the body parts were moving). The movement direction was described adopting the orthogonal body axis (sagittal, vertical and transverse). Examples of coding: Left arm action to the right; Up-down head shake; Right hand at waist; etc.
Annotation of Human Gesture [22] proposes an approach for transcribing gestural movements by overlaying a 3D body skeleton on the recorded actors' gestures. This way, once the skeleton data is aligned with the recorded data, the annotation can be created automatically.
RATA [23] presents a tool to create recognizers for touch and stylus gestures. The focus is on the ease and rapidity of the gesture recognition developing task. The authors claim that within 20 minutes (and by adding only two lines of code) developers and interaction designers can add new gestures to their application.
EventHurdle [13] presents a tool for explorative prototyping of gesture use on the application. The tool is proposed as an abstraction of the gathered sensor data, which can be visualized as a 2D graphic input. The designer also can specify the gesture in a provided graphical interface. The main concept is that unistroke touch gestures can be described as a sequence of trespassed hurdles.
GestureCoder [19] presents a tool for multi-touch gesture creation from performed examples. The recognition is performed by creating a state machine for the performed gestures with different names. The change of states is activated by some pre-coded actions: finger landing; lifting; moving; and timeout. The ambiguity of recorded gestures is solved by analyzing the motion between the gestures using a decision tree.
GestureLab [4] presents a tool for building domainspecific gesture recognizers. It focuses on pen unistroke gestures by considering trajectory but also additional attributes such as timing and pressure.
MAGIC [2] and MAGIC 2.0 [17] are tools to help developers, which are not experts in pattern recognition, to create gesture interfaces. Focuses on motion gesture (using data gathered from motion sensors, targeted to mobile scenario). MAGIC 2.0 focuses on false-positive prediction for these types of gestures. MAGIC comes with an "Everyday Gesture Library" (EGL), which contains videos of people performing gestures. MAGIC uses the EGL to perform dynamic testing for gesture conflicts, which is complementary to our language-based static approach.
Sensing and Privacy
The majority of work below focuses on privacy concerns in sensing applications. In Prepose, we add some security concerns into the mix, as well.
SurroundWeb [27] presents an immersive browser which tackles privacy issues by reducing the required privileges. The concept is based on a context sensing technology which can render different web contents on different parts of the room. In order to prevent the web pages to access the raw video stream of the room, SurroundWeb is proposed as a rendering platform through the Room Skeleton abstraction (which consists on a list of possible room "screens"). Moreover the SurroundWeb introduces a Detection Sandbox as a mediator between web pages and object detection code (never telling the web pages if objects were detected or not) and natural user inputs (mapping the inputs into mouse events to the web page).
Darkly [12] proposes a privacy protection system to prevent access of raw video data from sensors to untrusted applications. The protection is performed by controlling mechanisms over the acquired data. In some cases the privacy enforcement (transformations on the input frames) may reduce application functionality.
OS Support for AR Apps [6] and AR Apps with Recognizers [11] discusses the access the AR applications usually have to raw sensors and proposes OS extension to control the sent data by performing the recognizer tasks itself. This way the recognizer module is responsible to gather the sensed data and to process it locally, giving only the least needed privileges to AR applications.
MockDroid [3] proposes an OS modification for smart phones in which applications always ask the user to access the needed resources. This way users are aware of which information are being sent to the application whenever they run it, and then can decide between the trade-off of giving access or using the application functionality.
AppFence [9] proposes a tool for privacy control on mobile devices, which can block or shadow sent data to applications in order to keep the application up and running, but prevent exfiltration of on-device data. What You See is What You Get [10] proposes a widget which alerts users of which sensor is being requested by which application.
Recent work on world-driven access control restricts sensor input to applications in response to the environment, e.g. it can be used to disable access to the camera when in a bathroom [24] . Mazurek et al. surveyed 33 users about how they think about controlling access to data provided by a variety of devices, and discovered that many user's mental models of access control are incorrect [20] . Vaniea et al. performed an experiment to determine how users notice and fix access-control permission errors depending on where the access-control policy is spatially located on a web site [26] .
Conclusions
This paper introduces the Prepose language and runtime. Prepose allows developers to write high-level gesture descriptions that have semantics in terms of SMT formulas. Our architecture protects the privacy of the user by preventing untrusted applications from directly accessing raw sensor data; instead, applications register Prepose code with a trusted runtime. Sound static analysis helps eliminate possible security and reliability issues.
To test the expressiveness of Prepose, we have created 28 gestures in Prepose across three important and representative immersive programming domains. We also showed that Prepose programs can be statically analyzed quickly to check for safety, pairwise conflicts, and conflicts with system gestures.
Runtime matching in Prepose as well as static conflict checking, both of which reduce to Z3 queries, are sufficiently fast (milliseconds to several seconds) to be deployed. By writing gesture recognizers in a DSL deliberately designed from the ground up to support privacy, security, and reliability, we obtain strong guarantees without sacrificing either performance or expressiveness. Our Z3-based approach has more than acceptable performance in practice. Pose matching in Prepose averages 4 ms. Synthesizing target pose time ranges between 78 and 108 ms. Safety checking is under 0.5 seconds per gesture. The average validity checking time is only 188.63 ms. Lastly, for 97% of the cases, the conflict detection time is below 5 seconds, with only one query taking longer than 15 seconds. 
